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Humans can be instructed verbally to perform computationally complex cognitive tasks; their performance then improves relatively slowly
over the course of practice. Many skills underlie these abilities; in this paper, we focus on the particular question of a uniform architecture
for the instantiation of habitual performance and the storage, recall, and execution of simple rules. Our account builds on models of
gated working memory, and involves a bilinear architecture for representing conditional input-output maps and for matching rules to the
state of the input and working memory. We demonstrate the performance of our model on two paradigmatic tasks used to investigate
prefrontal and basal ganglia function.
Keywords: habits, rules, bilinearity, working memory, prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia
INTRODUCTION
Thereismuchrecentinterestinunderstandingandmodelinghowsubjects
perform a range of tasks that pose graded computational challenges
with respect to conditional input-output mappings (Badre et al., 2005;
Badre and D’Esposito, 2007; Boettiger and D’Esposito, 2005; Fusi et al.,
2007; Koechlin et al., 2003; Koechlin and Summerﬁeld, 2007), working
memory (Frank et al., 2001; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006), and even simple
branching subroutines (Braver and Bongiolatti, 2002; Koechlin et al.,
1999). One obvious fact about these experiments is the huge advantage
that linguistically capable humans have over other animals (and most
models), in that the former can be effectively “programmed” with just
a few words to perform complex tasks; whereas animals require much
longer periods of training, and even architectural (O’Reilly and Frank,
2006) and/or training-based (Krueger and Dayan, 2007)h i n t s .T ou s e
terminology borrowed from conditioning (Daw et al., 2005; Dickinson,
1985), the extensive training may be building a habit, or a collection
thereof; by comparison, humans can presumably use rules more akin to
a forward-model of the task (e.g., Bunge, 2004), and act according to a
mixture of the output of this forward-model system and a more slowly
trained, automatized, habitual control system (e.g., Anderson, 1982; Daw
et al., 2005; Dickinson, 1985; Logan, 1988; Sloman, 1996).
The power of language as an input medium is obviously not to be
denied. However, the question for this paper is what substrates for
control might mediate the instant programmability which is conferred by
language. That is, could there be a uniform architecture for control which
can instantiate habits, but also provides an implementational substrate
for simple rules? This question raises a host of issues to do with the initial
creation of rules (Duncan, personal communication), which is analogous
∗ Correspondence: Peter Dayan, Gatsby Computational Neuroscience Unit, UCL, London,
UK. e-mail: dayan@gatsby.ucl.ac.uk
Received: 09 Aug. 2007; paper pending published: 27 Aug. 2007; accepted: 12 Oct.
2007; published online: 02 Nov. 2007
Full citation: Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience (2007) 1:1
doi: 10.3389/neuro.10.001.2007
Copyright: © 2007 Dayan. This is an open-access article subject to an exclusive license
agreement between the authors and the Frontiers Research Foundation, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
authors and source are credited.
to compilation, and also the storage, recall, and matching of rules to the
current state. The state is a combination of the internal representation of
immediate sensory input and the contents of working memory. These are
obviouslyverybroadquestions;wewillseekonlypartialanswers,andalso
in a relatively abstract treatment of the problem. In particular, we do not
solve the compilation problem, but rather assume that a decomposition
of a task into a set of rules can be provided.
We build a uniform architecture, and show how it can embody both
habits and rules. Our model of habits was inspired by Frank et al. (2001),
O’ReillyandFrank(2006),RigottiandFusi(2006),andRigottiet al.(2007),
using a bilinear architecture to instantiate an input-output mapping.
Here, the input is the state mentioned above, which consists of the
current sensory observations together with the contents of activity-based
working memory, which, for our present purposes, stores information
aboutpastsensoryobservations.Theoutputincludesactionswithexternal
consequences, such as pressing a left or right lever, and ones with
internal consequences, such as reading or gating (Frank et al., 2001)
the current sensory observation into working memory, or indeed clearing
some element of working memory. The bilinearity has a similar purpose
to the hidden units used by Rigotti and Fusi (2006) and Rigotti et al.
(2007), allowing tasks with complex input-output contingencies to be
executed.
Instead of specifying a task as a single, complex, input-output
mapping, a set of rules allows it to be decomposed into a set of
simple input-output mappings. Duncan (personal communication) cited
theexampleofaboardgame;thereistypicallyamoderatenumberofrules,
each of which only applies in a restricted circumstance, and speciﬁes a
simple contingency. Using rules therefore requires a number of steps to
be followed.
Our rules have two parts—one specifying the conditions under which
they apply; the second indicating the contingency they seek to impose.
These rules are stored in an episodic-like memory, and are retrieved via
associativerecall,basedonsimilarityoftheirmatchingconditionswiththe
fullcontentsofthecurrentstate.However,thedeterminantsofassociative
episodic recall are expected to be laxer than those precise conditions
speciﬁed in the rules themselves, in particular not specifying aspects of
the state that should not be present or be true. Therefore, there is an
additional process of rule matching, which involves assessing whether
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the state is indeed appropriate for a rule to be activated. This can also be
performed in a multilinear manner (i.e., in the form of another internally
directed output), consistent with the uniformity of the architecture as a
whole. If the rule matches in detail, then the contingency it demands is
imposed as another, simple, input-output mapping, of exactly the same
form as a habit, and learned in the same manner.
Using two paradigmatic examples from the literature, we show that
bilinear habits can be acquired, along with the interactions necessary to
implement individual rules.
This paper draws on three main traditions. The ﬁrst is the extensive
line of work into the psychological and neural substrates of complex
tasks that are putatively dependent on extensive regions of prefrontal
cortex (Badre and D’Esposito, 2007; Brass and von Cramon, 2002, 2004;
Bunge, 2004; Christoff and Gabrieli, 2000; Cohen et al., 1996; Cooper
and Shallice, 2006; D’Esposito et al., 2000; Frank et al., 2001; Fuster,
1997; Koechlin and Jubault, 2006; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Rougier
et al., 2005; Sakai and Passingham, 2003; Williams and Goldman-Rakic,
1995; Wood and Grafman, 2003). We model two cases—ﬁrst, one of the
conditionalinput-outputtasksthatKoechlinet al.(2003)andKoechlinand
Summerﬁeld (2007) used to investigate an apparent hierarchy of control
structures in extensive regions of lateral prefrontal cortex; and second,
the conditional one-back 12AX task invented by Frank et al. (2001) to
elucidate the interaction between prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia
inan-homuncularcontrolandworkingmemory.AlthoughIamnotawareof
any published psychological or functional neuro-imaging test of the 12AX
task,itisavariantoftheN-backworkingmemorytask(Braveret al.,2001;
Cohen et al., 1997; Gevins and Cutillo, 1993; Rowe et al., 2000), which,
along with other areas, is known to involve various prefrontal regions (see
Owen et al., 2005). We chose these particular tasks since they present a
rangeofcomputationalchallenges,andbecausetheycanbothbecaptured
using the same abstractions of sensory input and working memory.
Thesecondtraditionisthemodelingworkassociatedwithsuchcontrol
problems.Weborrowinsightsfromtwoapproaches:thepre-frontal,basal
ganglia, working memory (PBWM) model that Frank et al. (2001), Hazy
et al. (2006, 2007), and O’Reilly and Frank (2006) used to solve their
illustrative12AXtask,andtheworkingmemoryandcontrolmodelsofFusi,
Wang,andtheircolleagues(Fusiet al.,2007;RigottiandFusi,2006;Rigotti
et al., 2007; Wang, 2002). The analysis that led to PBWM started from the
important difference between weight-based and activity-based storage,
with the latter being analogous to working memory. Building on the ideas
of Hochreiter and Schmidhuber (1997), PBWM suggests that key to the
use of working memory is the non-linear operation of gating (Braver and
Cohen, 2000; Cohen et al., 1996; Frank et al., 2001); namely that cortico-
striato-thalamo-corticalloops(AlexanderandCrutcher,1990)wouldallow
cortical (and sub-cortical) control over whether information is stored in,
or retrieved from, working memory cortical micro-circuits in prefrontal
cortex (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2002; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Williams
andGoldman-Rakic,1995).Thiscontrolmechanismpermitsthesolutionof
sophisticatedconditionalinput-outputtasks,andalsoprovidesanaccount
ofthestep-by-step,sequentialperformancerequiredinmanytasksinvolv-
ing extended working memory. Frank et al. (2001) originally set weights
effectively by hand (a tactic we also borrow) to show that their overall
model could support the computations required for the 12AX task; they
laterconsideredhowsuchweightscouldemergethroughon-linelearning
(Hazy et al., 2006, 2007; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006; O’Reilly et al., 2007).
The other approach to working memory and control is less
architecturally comprehensive than PBWM, but includes a more detailed
view of working memory itself (Wang, 2002). It has also led to a more
complete model (Fusi et al., 2007) of a particular, inﬂuential conditional
visuo-motor task that has been administered to monkeys (Pasupathy and
Miller, 2005). As mentioned above, both these modeling approaches have
concentrated on habitual control; by contrast, we are mainly interested in
the link between habitual and rule-based notions. However, our habitual
architecture does owe a particular debt to Rigotti and Fusi (2006) and
Rigotti et al. (2007), who observed that the conditionality of conditional
input-output tasks typically results in problems that are not linearly
separable (like the famous XOR or negative patterning problem), and so
demand something equivalent to hidden units. Multilinearity is one of the
simplest examples of such a mechanism.
The elemental operations associated with multilinearity have been
considered before. In particular, PBWM’s central operation is gating,
as applied to the control of the ﬂow of information into speciﬁc and
changeablepartsofworkingmemory.Givensimplebinaryrepresentations
of inputs and working memory, gating is a primitive multiplicative
operation. Here, we consider more general multilinear models, which
were observed by Koenderink and Van Doorn (1997) to be the normatively
correct abstraction for a wealth of psychophysical computations, further
developed by Tenenbaum and Freeman (2000) as a powerful statistical
modeling technique for a variety of self-supervised learning questions,
and used by Dayan (2006) to capture the way the focus of attention
operates in exploring the hierarchical analysis and synthesis of internal
representations of visual objects.
The multiplicative operations inherent in multilinearity are also closely
related to those used in multidimensional basis functions suggested
by Poggio (1990) and Pouget (1997), and also the shifter circuits of
Olshausen et al. (1993). Dayan’s (2006) model was also inspired by work
in the early days of connectionism (see Hinton, 1991) which considered
issues in neural representation of, and computation with, structured
information, including versions of habit- and rule-based processing
(Hinton, 1990). However, we are not claiming that there is an obvious
neural implementation of bilinearity or multilinearity, let alone of the way
thatrulesaresupposedtoworkbydeterminingparticularinteractions.We
suggest that the worth in our model is as a stepping-stone toward more
realistic, though inevitably more complex, treatments.
In the next section, we describe the two tasks on which we focus,
together with the constraints on the model they impose. We then describe
the model in detail, together with the way we determined the existence of
appropriate weights. Following that, we show that the model can indeed
solve the tasks, using either rule-based or habitual mechanisms. Finally,
we discuss the implications of the work, together with pressing future
directions.
THE TASKS
We consider two tasks, one, which we will call CIOM, used by Koechlin
et al. (2003), which emphasizes complex conditional input-output maps;
and the other, the so-called 12AX task, from Frank et al. (2001), which
stresses the sequential interaction between the contents of working
memoryanddirectstimulusinput.Wedescribethetasks,andalsopossible
rules underlying their satisfactory execution.
One reason for selecting these particular tasks is that, although they
proberatherdifferentpartsofthespaceofcognitiveproblems,theycanbe
described in rather similar ways, involving similar classes of input and at
leastsomeaspectsofworkingmemory,and,mostparticularly,conditional
input-outputmapsthatpotentiallycombinetheentirecontentsofworking
memorywiththatofthecurrentinputtodeterminewhatactionisrequired.
More particularly, both tasks can be seen as involving two different
sorts or types of input stimuli. One of these indicates which of a number
(eightforCIOM;twofor12AX)oftasksubcomponentsisactiveforablock.
This information needs to be read into and stored by working memory for
the duration of the block. Stimuli of the other type (here represented as
colors) indicate on an input-by-input basis what action is required of the
subjects. The 12AX task demands that some of these stimuli are also
read into working memory; the CIOM task does not. We will assume a
working memory with separate parts (“stripes,” Frank et al., 2001; Lund
et al.,1993;Pucaket al.,1996)fortaskWM andcolorWM subcomponents
(using a sans-serif font and the subscript to indicate that these refer to
working memory).
Actionscanbeexternallydirected(suchaspushingaparticularbutton)
or internally directed (manipulating working memory). We will consider
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both classes as proceeding in two stages—ﬁrst a choice of whether to
executeanysuchaction,andthenachoiceofwhich.Thisimpliesthatthere
are six binary actions, two external (one we call e-act, which determines
whether or not to act externally; and L/R, which determines which button
to push), and four internal (i-act, whether or not to act internally; store,
which reads the current sensory input into working memory; and clear-t
andclear-c,whichclearthetaskWM andcolorWM componentsofworking
memory,respectively.Wediscusstherationalefori-actande-actinmore
detail below.
CIOM
Koechlin et al. (2003) sought to elucidate the contributions of different
lateral prefrontal areas in control by designing a task with factorial
demands associated with stimuli and responses. Their task involved 16
different subcomponents; we consider just the eight shown in Table 1.
Subjects would ﬁrst see an identiﬁer associated with whichever of the
subcomponents was about to start; and would then see a number of
colored squares (12 per subcomponent block) according to which they
would have to press a left or a right button (L or R), or do nothing. The
critical factors in the design are that:

green,red,andwhitecolorsarealwaysassociatedwithasingleaction
(left, right, or nothing, respectively), whereas yellow, blue, and cyan
are associated with all three actions (with one being twice as frequent
as the others); 
in tasks 1,2; 5,6, subjects need only prepare one possible active
response (either a left or a right button press); in tasks 3,4; 7,8, they
have to prepare both.
Koechlin et al. (2003) showed that subjects’ reaction times (following
learning of the task) implied a rough partial order of difﬁculty:
1,2 < 3,4   5,6 < 7,8
suggesting that both factors inﬂuence performance in a measured
manner. They analyzed fMRI BOLD data using the factors to generate
informative contrasts. We discuss the imaging ﬁndings in Section
Discussion.
CIOM’s rules are conceptually straightforward. The main requirement
is to remember which of the eight possible subcomponents is active. This
can be done by reading the identiﬁer for the subcomponent into working
memory when it occurs (clearing out the old identiﬁer from the previous
subcomponent if necessary) and storing it for the block. Conditioned on
thesecontentsofworkingmemory,theremainingrulescanallbespeciﬁed
as separate, albeit, potentially complex input-output mappings that can
be represented in the form shown in Table 2. This rule matches the task
component of working memory (the “taskWM = 1”), provided that there
is a color input, and instantiates a conditional map from this immediate
input (i.e., the color) to the six binary outputs.
It will be important for the later discussion to note that there are
different possible collections of rules that can implement the same task,
but that place different demands on (the closely related operations of)
matching and mapping. An example of two alternative rules is shown
in Table 3. These put all the onus on matching, whence the action
map is formally trivial. Despite the functional equivalence of the different
sets of rules, the demands on rule memory are, of course, different. In
general, the different sets are different possible outcomes of the process
of compilation—there is no single correct answer.
Note further that the second of Koechlin et al.’s (2003) factors implies
an extra simpliﬁcation in the rules. For tasks 1,2; 5,6, there is only
one possible action for a whole subcomponent, and therefore no need
to choose which externally directed action to do, because there is no
competition. This is formally a Go/NoGo task, whose striatal instantiation
via direct and indirect, D1 and D2 circuits (e.g., Frank et al., 2004) may
be rather different from the other cases, in which there is competition
between different external actions. For Go/NoGo, we assume that the
decision can be based solely on the e-act action.
12AX
The 12AX task is a conditional version of the one-back task. In its original
form, subjects see a sequence consisting of the numbers “1” and “2,”
and the letters “A,” “B,” “C,” “X,” “Y,” and “Z.” Their task is to press one
button (say L) for every input except that the “X” of “AX” in the case that
the most recent number had been a “1,” and the “Y” of “BY” if the most
recent number had been a “2” require R to be pressed. The “1” can be
followed by a varying number of “AXs,” embedded in essentially random
other letters before the “2” is shown.1
We put this into the same framework as the CIOM task by treating
the “1” and “2” as specifying different task subcomponents, and then
substituting the six possible colors for the six possible letters. However,
the sequential structure of the task means that the rules governing its
evolution are now much more complicated. Again, there are various
possibilities for rule sets. One example is given in Table 4, this time
involvingtwounconditionalrulesforstoringthetasksubcomponents,and
four input-conditional rules. Note that both external and internal actions
are required for every single input for this task, unlike CIOM. The extra
matching conditions associated with the lower four rules are to ensure
that no more than one rule matches at a time. In general, precedence
relations among rules may be necessary.
THE MODEL
Figure 1showsthebasicarchitectureofthemodel.Itcomprisestwomain
parts which are separately discussed below:
1. A bilinear mapping from the state, deﬁned by the contents of working
memory and the input, to the six externally and internally directed
actions that are described above, and shown in the rule tables.
2. The rule recall and matching mechanisms. These are responsible for
recalling rules from an episodic store based on associative similarity
with the current state of working memory and stimulus input, and
then for the bilinear process of matching to ensure that the precise
conditions of the rule are met. A rule that matches is taken as
determining an alternative bilinear input-output map that controls
internally and externally directed responding.
Morecompletedetailsofthearchitectureandvarioustrainingregimesare
given in the Appendix.
Asstressedabove,itisobviousthatthesesuggestionsaremuchfurther
removed from the neural substrate than those of the “parent” models of
Frank et al. (2001), Fusi et al. (2007), and O’Reilly and Frank (2006). The
keynotionthattherearealternativebilinearmappingsthatcanbeimposed
through the operation of a rule (or, if no rule is retrieved or matched, then
by default as a habit) is particularly troubling in this respect. However, as
also implied in the work of Dayan (2006) and Tenenbaum and Freeman
(2000), we suggest that this abstraction is useful, since it allows us to
focus on the relationship between rules and habits, and, in the longer run,
to consider the status of rules with respect to the overall statistical space
of bilinear mappings.
OurnotionofgatedworkingmemoryisborroweddirectlyfromPBWM,
with the operations:
Store the current input into working memory. Both tasks require this; for
the 12AX task in particular, the nature of the input determines which
of the two components of working memory should be used.
Clear working memory. For the 12AX task, the option of clearing one of
the two components without the other is required.
1 There are obviously many possible variants of the task with different statistics
for the different sub-parts. Although this is critical for some aspects of learning
(Krueger and Dayan, 2007), it is not central for our present concerns.
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Table 1. The CIOM task of Koechlin et al. (2003).
Thetableshowstherulesforpressingleft(L),right(R),orno(·)buttonsforeachcoloredinputfortheeightsubcomponentsofthetask.Insubcomponent
1, green squares are shown twice as often as the white squares (the “L;L”) to equalize the informational content. The same is true for red squares in
subcomponent2.Notethatthecolorswereactuallypresentedassmallblocks,notcolornames.Thelowerplotshowsanexampleofthetrials,involving
small segments of subcomponents 2 and 3 (the latter at the start), and subcomponents 4 and 6. They were randomized for the human subjects; here
this is immaterial.
Table 2. Sample rule for CIOM.
The leftmost column indicates the condition that must match the state for the rule to be appropriate. The right columns show the input (second column)
tooutput(lastsixcolumns)mappingsforthetaskgiventhattherulematches.Here,therearejusttwopossibleinputs(sincetheﬁrsttasksubcomponent
only involves green or white squares); the two rows indicate the required states of the six output action units for the two possible inputs. Outputs e-act
and i-act specify whether there is any external or internal action at all; if not, then the subject does nothing. If e-act=1, L/R indicates whether the
external action is to press the left or right button. If i-act had been 1 for any of these cases, then store, clear-t, and clear-c, which are binary variables,
would, if set to 1, specify the actions of storing the current input in its associated working memory stripe, or clearing the task or color working memory
stripes of whatever they contain (if anything). The boxes left blank in the table are unspeciﬁed by the rule; they do not affect performance in the task.
Table 3. Alternative rule descriptions for the ﬁrst subcomponent of the CIOM task.
The rule described in Table 2 can instead be described (in the same format) by two rules with more complex matching conditions (specifying the input
as well as the state of the task working memory), but whose input-output mappings are simpler (with no input dependence).
Frank et al. (2001) suggested the involvement of basal ganglia structures
viatheirloopswithcortexinimplementingsuchgatingoperations.Asalso
for them, we employ a localist (i.e., 1 of n) coding for both classes of input
(task and color). This is largely for convenience; sparse distributed codes
would also work.
The bilinear mapping
This network involves a standard bilinear mapping with binary
output units. More formally, given (binary) input vector x, which
includes the contents of working memory and the stimulus
input, the output oc of unit c is determined stochastically
4
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Table 4. Rule set for the 12AX task.
Using the same format as Tables 2 and 3, this table shows a collection of six rules that could underly the 12AX task. This task requires an output for
each input; so e-act=1. The ﬁrst two rules store “1” and “2” in taskWM; the next two control storage of “A” (here, red) for context “1” and “B” (here,
green) for context “2;” the last two rules implement “AX” for context “1” (“X” is yellow) and “BY” for context “2” (“Y” is blue). The matching conditions
and the input-output conditions are both complex for this task. We assume that the working memory component should be cleared before the input is
stored, although this presumably should be better thought of as a single operation.
Figure 1. The model. To avoid overwhelming complexity, the three panels show three separate facets of the model. Complete details are provided in the
Appendix. (A) The bilinear structure controlling ultimate execution. Input and working memory units are divided into separate components (stripes, Frank et al.,
2001) for task and color inputs; the bilinear form has six binary output units. The arrow from the left allows the rule to instantiate a bilinear form. (B) Read
into and clearing the working memory is under control of the three internally directed actions. (C) The rule memory, recall, and matching process showing the
associative and exact matching processes, and the means for implementing the rule as the bilinear form in (A).
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according to:
P(o
c = 1) = σ


ij
xiW
c
ijxj +

i
u
c
ixi + b
c

(1)
where σ(ζ) = 1/(1+ exp(−ζ)) is the conventional logistic sigmoid
function. Here, the term involving Wc implements the bilinearity. There is
one set of parameters  c ={ Wc,uc,b c} for each of the output units
oc. Note that the architectures of Rigotti and Fusi (2006) and Rigotti
et al. (2007) use a different route to generate hidden units with related
capacities.
Rather like Frank et al. (2001) themselves, we start by considering
whether there is any settings of the whole collection of parameters  =
{ c} that instantiates the required computational structure (we actually
useanon-biologicallearningproceduretoﬁndsuchweights).2 Wedothis
byspecifyingasupervisedtrainingregimethatcouldcome,forinstance,if
observations of both internally and externally directed actions determined
throughtheoperationoftheruleswasavailabletothehabitlearner.Inboth
cases, during training, information about errors in the externally directed
actionswouldbeavailableforeachinput.Thus,thekeyrequirementisfor
the internally directed actions (such as preserving in working memory the
identity of the current task subcomponent) to be made evident. This also
arranges for a form of teaching-forcing (Williams and Zipser, 1989)t ob e
effective,withthecontentsofworkingmemorybeingdeterminedcorrectly
even when the habitual bilinear mapping is far from being accurate.
Weusedagradient-basedmaximumlikelihoodmethodfordetermining
appropriateweights.Outputswithoutsupervisioninformation(suchasthe
non-existent choice between L and R button presses in tasks 1 and 2 of
CIOM), do not generate errors and were not considered to be part of
the training set. For CIOM, we generated a training set that completely
describes all the contingencies. This is not so straightforward for the
12AX task because of the stochasticity associated with the switching
betweenthesubcomponentsandthecoloredstimulusinputsthemselves.
Therefore,wegeneratedamoderate-sizedtrainingset(with384elements
in the sequence) exactly according to the stochastic rules for the task,
and trained with that. As will be seen later, this was ample to ensure good
quality generalization when we tested on novel input sequences.
The main formal difference between the training and testing regimes
for the habits is associated with teacher forcing. During testing, outputs
arising stochastically through the operation of the bilinear map are
themselves used to determine the state of the working memory. For
CIOM, this is very straightforward, because the task makes only such
simple demands on working memory. The 12AX task has more complex
temporal dependencies, and so this is more challenging.
Rule memory and matching
The rule memory is assumed to be a form of auto-associative storage
and recall device. Rules share many computational commonalities with
episodic memories, in that there is a large number of closely related
patternsthatneedtobestoredinsuchawaythattheyareverydistinct,and
thenrecalledbasedonsimilarity.Ofcourse,otherfeaturesassociatedwith
episodicmemory,suchasthenotionofmentaltimetravel(Tulving,2002),
and the explicit storage of substantial context surrounding a memory,
are of less importance for rules. We adopt a similar abstraction to that
employed by Kali and Dayan (2004) in their work on the relationship
between a putatively hippocampal episodic memory and a cortical self-
supervised, representational learner which acted as a form of statistical
semantic memory.
Recall of potential rules is similar to recall of episodes. This is based
on the associative match between the (matching portions of) items in the
episodic memory for rules and aspects of the current state, which here
2 Hazy et al. (2006, 2007), O’Reilly and Frank (2006), and O’Reilly et al. (2007) went
on to show that the weights required for their model could be acquired through a
modiﬁed form of reinforcement learning.
includesboththeworkingmemoryandthestimulusinput.Theexpectation
would be that only one, or at most a few, rules would arise as possible
associativematches.However,episodicmemoriesandrulesdifferinterms
of the way that they should generalize. Rules should apply only in very
particular circumstances that depend on precise matching between their
preconditions and particular aspects of the current state. By contrast,
episodic recall is less exclusive—a whole range of episodic memories
may bear a relevant relationship to any particular state. In particular, rules
can have exclusion conditions, that is, requirements that the input state
not have a property. These are hard to enforce during associative recall,
though easy during bilinear matching.
Therefore, we allow directly for the possibility that a number of rules
is retrieved from memory, but allow their preconditions to be precisely
tested to determine the existence of an exact match. At present, we only
consider rule sets such that a single rule will actually match at any stage
in the task; we consider more general possibilities in the discussion. In
particular, there are three underlying possibilities for rule matching with
respect to the current input state x. We will therefore describe rule r as
ar with ar
i ∈{ 1,0,−1}. A detailed match could require that xi = 1( w e
use ar
i = 1), could require that xi = 0( ar
i =− 1) or not care (ar
i = 0).
It turns out that this can be suitably computed by the bilinear threshold
function:
o
m =


i
a
r
i(3xi − a
r
i − 1) −| { a
r
i = 1}| +
1
2

+
(2)
where the threshold can also be seen as the limit of a very steep logistic
sigmoid function, and where the term |{ai = 1}| counts the number of
required exact matches.
Wemodelassociativerecallaseliminatingalltheexclusionconditions,
and then using a form of k-winner takes all (similar to that adopted,
for instance, by O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000). That is, we treat it as
calculating
m
r =

i
(xi − [a
r
i]+)
2
for each rule r, and reporting all those rules that have mr less than or
equal to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd ...kth, etc smallest, where k is a parameter. In
thissimplecase,wesetk = 1,althoughnotethatmorethanonerulecan
be retrieved if many are equidistant from the current state of input and
working memory. Note that the competition embodied in this k-winner
takes all rule can also be implemented using multilinearity (Fusi, personal
communication).
Once a rule has been recalled and deemed an appropriate match,
its associated conditional input-output map needs to be instantiated.
In the current, highly simpliﬁed, version of the model, we accomplish
this by learning an appropriate set of bilinear weights for each rule, and
imposing those weights directly. As we will see, the input-output map
associated with any particular rule is substantially simpler than (and often
asubcomponentof)thatassociatedwiththetaskasawhole.Wegenerate
appropriate weights for each rule using the same training procedure as
for habits, but based on training sets that are much simpler and smaller,
since each rule only has a very limited domain.
Wediscusstherepresentationalrelationshipbetweenrulesandhabits
later. Just as in standard accounts of proceduralization (e.g., Anderson,
1982),automatization(Logan,1988),orhabitization(Dawet al.,2005),we
would expect the inferential relationship to be that rules would dominate
in the early part of behavior, with habits dominating later. However, in
the current version of the model, we do not maintain or propagate the
uncertainty about the habits that is suggested by Daw et al. (2005) as
underlyingtheswitchincontrolfromonesystemtotheother,andtherefore
just show the separate rule-based and habit-based solutions to the two
tasks.
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RESULTS
CIOM
Aswehaveindicated,theCIOMtaskplacesstrongemphasisonthenature
of the conditional input-output maps, for the externally directed output,
and rather less on the use of working memory. We may therefore expect
thattherulesandthehabitualbilinearformsassociatedwiththeinternally
directed actions to be rather simple—the only requirement on working
memory is to store (and preserve) the task identiﬁer.
Habitual learning. Figure 2 shows the course of gradient descent
learning (starting from zero weights and using a training set derived from
the operation of the rules) for the habitual solution to the task. The output
of the habitual model for any input is a probability of doing an action.
However,theobviousexperimentalmeasureofperformanceisthereaction
time; as reported, for instance, by Koechlin et al. (2003). We therefore
translate between the two for an action under the assumption that the
psychologicallyandneurallypopulardriftdiffusiondecision-makingmodel
(Smith and Ratcliff, 2004) controls the decision, with the magnitude of the
drift being determined by the input to the sigmoid for that action. For a
simple drift-diffusion model (DDM), the RT and the probability of correct
terminationaretwosidesofthesamecoin.WestressthattheseRTsshould
not be thought of as much more than a way of illustrating the course of
learning; not only do subjects’ actual RTs have substantial non-decision-
making components, but also they will likely reﬂect the operation of both
rule-based and habitual control systems to a degree that will change over
time (in favor of the latter). We do not attempt to model the reaction times
fortherule-basedsolution,sincethedynamicsofassociativeruleretrieval
and implementation are not so well explored.
The four learning curves in Figure 2 show the DDM of the reaction
timesforthefourdifferenttypesofsub-taskintheoverallproblem.Forthe
sub-tasks with only one possible active button press (1,2; 5,6, in red and
blue, respectively), the DDM controls the decision e-act about whether or
not to perform an externally directed action. For these subcomponents,
the decision to act is really a Go/NoGo task.
For the sub-tasks with a choice between left and right button presses
(3,4; 7,8, in green and black, respectively), the RTs reﬂect two decisions,
one to act at all (e-act); and one declaring which action (L/R). That is, with
two different active outputs, the task is no longer merely Go/NoGo, and
so involves more complex, and (judging from Koechlin et al., 2003) more
time-consuming competition. The RTs associated with the two decisions
could be combined in various ways, from a sum to a max (or even as
a ﬁrst-past-the-post rule for the two diffusion processes), depending on
the exact nature of the underlying decision-making structure. As a simple
compromise, Figure 2 shows the p-norm of the two RTs (where p =
3). The graph shows well the large initial cost of this (black and green
curves start substantially above the red and blue curves), although they
all decrease appropriately. For this particular p-norm, the costs in terms
of RT associated with the two separate factors that Koechlin et al. (2003)
identiﬁedrapidlybecomealmostequal.Thatis,thecostofhavingmultiple
choices active in a single sub-task (the green curve, for tasks 3,4) is
roughly the same as having multiple possible choices across sub-tasks
for a stimulus input (the blue curve). This is actually quite consistent with
the true reaction times observed by Koechlin et al. (2003). However, this
identity is not strongly robust to the way that the two RTs are combined
for the case of tasks 3,4. Nevertheless, the cost of the complexity of the
rules in the task is clear in comparing the ease of learning for tasks 1,2
with that for tasks 5,6.
Figure 3 shows the bilinear weights that underlie the performance
after all the learning trials in Figure 2. The format of this plot is described
in the Figure caption. As expected from the nature of the task, most of the
complexity is shown in those weights for the externally directed output
units (top row of Figure 3) that are associated with the stimulus input
(second half of x). The only internally directed action is to store (and not
forget) the identiﬁer. The negative weights along the diagonal associated
Figure 2. Nominal reaction times for the CIOM task. The curves show p-
norm reaction times for the eight different subcomponents of the CIOM task
as a function of learning iterations using simple gradient descent. The RTs
associated with each individual binary output are derived from the underlying
drift diffusion model; and, for the tasks involving an active L/R choice, are
combinedusingthe3norm.Ifthebilinearweightsareallowedtogetarbitrarily
large, then the probabilities of each output unit tend toward 0 and 1, and the
decision-making RT tends toward 0.
with the taskWM working memory for the i-act units arise because of
the demands of not forgetting the identiﬁer (this is particularly clear by
comparison with the weights associated with the store output unit). An
artefact of the training set is i.e., assumed that the working memory
units had been zeroed between sub-tasks, and so these weights did not
inﬂuence or affect the task of learning to execute i-act. In fact, these
weights are adequate even if a taskWM working memory had still been
present; however, this points out a key comparison between rules and
habits to do with the former’s ready invariance to irrelevant aspects of the
(sub-)task.
Rules. As noted, this task can be solved with two classes of rules:
one to store the identiﬁers, and eight to execute the subcomponents.
Under our simple model, the most convenient way to store the identiﬁers
is to have eight separate rules, each of which matches its associated
identiﬁer in the input, and then has a trivial input-output mapping which
is to execute i-act, clear-t, and store. Matching is straightforward using
Equation (2).
Theexecutionofthesubcomponentsismoreinteresting.Asdescribed
in the previous section, one way of doing it is to have matching conditions
thatdependontwofactors:thecontentsoftaskWM workingmemorybeing
appropriate, and the input itself not being a new task identiﬁer. Then the
rules deﬁne conditional input-output mappings appropriate to each task
subcomponent. Figure 4 shows the e-act and L/R bilinear forms for four
representative subcomponents. By comparison with the form in Figure 3,
theyareverysimple,sincetheyonlyconcernonepartofthemorecomplex
overall map, and, indeed, are partly subsets of the dependencies in the
full rule. Their forms are readily interpretable given the structure of the
sub-tasks presented in Section The Tasks.
Figure 5illustratestheoperationoftherules.Thetoppanelshowsthe
inputs and the outputs produced by the model (all of which are correct).
Themiddlepanelindicatesthenumberoftherulethatmatched.Numbers
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Figure 3. Habit-based weights for CIOM. Each block shows the weights associated with one of the output units; the main matrix shows W, with the state units
xi ordered as shown; the last column shows u and the bias b for the unit is given as a number on top. The upper row of blocks is for the two externally directed
actions (labels on the right); the lower row is for the four internally directed actions. The range of the gray-scale is determined by the biases ([−4,3,4.3]). Note
that W is symmetrical; we show the full matrix for convenience.
Figure 4. Rules for CIOM. These plots use the same form as in Figure 3 to show the rules for the two key output units, e-act and L/R. The rules are simple in
form, since they only concern individual rules, and also do not need to handle the additional matching conditions.
1–8 are associated with their eponymous subcomponent; numbers 9–16
are the rules that are responsible for storing the task identiﬁers (1–8,
respectively) when they arise. The bottom panel shows how many rules
were extracted by the associative memory. During each subcomponent
block, only the rule associated with that block is extracted from the rule
memory. However, when the identiﬁers appear (at sequence points 14,
27, and 40 in the ﬁgure), the rule associated with switching the task
subcomponent is extracted as well. This is because the extra condition
that stops the ﬁrst rule from matching in detail is that there should be no
task input; and, as a negative condition, has no effect over associative
recall.
12AX task
The 12AX task imposes a much heavier burden on the intricacies of
working memory than the CIOM task, and therefore we expect that the
internally directed actions will exhibit a richer structure.
Habitual learning. Figure 6 shows the course of gradient descent
learning for this task. As mentioned, for the 12AX task, it is not so
straightforwardtospecifyacompletetrainingset,andso,instead,learning
proceeded on the basis of a single, random, input sequence of 384
elements (in this case involving 27 subcomponents, and 57 “AX” or “BY”
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Figure 5. Rule execution for the conditioned input-output task. From the top, these plots show the inputs and output; the identify of the rule that matches,
and the number of rules that were associatively extracted. Details in the text.
sub-sequences). The Figure shows the result of testing the bilinear model
onfresh,randomsequences,oflength200(eachpointistheaverageover
10differentsuchsequences;theerrorbarsshowthestandarddeviations),
showing the accumulated errors based on stochastic draws from the
probabilities associated with each output unit. This includes, for instance,
the possibility of inappropriately failing to store the “1” or the “2,” and
thereby omitting all the sub-sequences within the sequence. The network
evidently learns to perform well.
Figure 7 shows weights suitable for executing the 12AX task, using
thesameformatasinFigure 3.Asexpected,thecontingenciesassociated
with acting on working memory are now more sophisticated than those
associated with those acting externally. Note that only the ﬁrst two
subcomponents of the task input and working memory are involved,
and so parts of the matrices are null. Further, an externally directed
Figure 6. Errors over learning on the 12AX task. The graph shows the
average number of errors committed by the network on untrained, random,
sequences of length 200. The network was run stochastically, with the
probability of executing the action associated with an output unit being
determined by its probability.
action is required on every trial, so e-act is driven mostly by its positive
bias b.
Rules. Fortheparticularcollectionofrulesshownintheprevioussection,
matching plays a greater part than do the conditional input-output maps
themselves.Forinstance,Figure 8showsanexampleofthebilinearform
associatedwiththeruleindicatingwhattodoatthepoint“*”inasequence
suchas“1...A*.”Theconditionalmapissimple—ifan“X”isshownthen
press the right button, otherwise press the left button; but in either case,
clearcolorcomponentofworkingmemoryunless“A”isshownagain.The
process of matching deals with all the dependence on working memory;
leaving a rule that only depends on the input color. The two conditional
aspects of the rule are themselves evident in the L/R and clear-c blocks
in the ﬁgure.
Figure 9 shows the execution of rules, using the same format as
in Figure 5. The much more complicated structure of rule execution
is evident; however, it is seething under the bland surface of the near
constant output “L.” Again, just a moderate number of rules is recalled
from the associative rule memory at any point in the sequence; and, by
design of the rules, only a single one matches.
DISCUSSION
Summary and lacunæ
Even though learned habits can allow us to negotiate even the most
computationally complex of environments, we have a striking ability for
ﬂexibleandnearinstantaneous(re-)programming.Here,wecharacterized
this latter ability in terms of rules, and showed that it is possible to place
habitual and rule-based control on a common functional footing with
respect to execution. Our architecture has two closely related parts; one
that implements conditional input-output mappings; the other that medi-
atesthestorageandrecallofrulesfromanassociativestore,togetherwith
precise matching of the conditions of the rules to the state of the working
memory and stimulus input. Both the conditional input-output mapping
and the rule matching involved bilinear computations (followed by binary
decisions),asastraightforwardgeneralizationawayfromasingle,feedfor-
ward,layerofprocessing.Weshowedhowhabitsandrulescouldsolvetwo
paradigmatic cognitive tasks that probe complex conditional input-output
mappingsandworkingmemory,andcontrastedpropertiesofthesolutions.
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Figure 7. Habit-based bilinear weights for the 12AX task. Weights are shown in the same format as in Figure 3. Again, the bias terms deﬁne the maximum
and minimum values across the plots.
Figure 8. Bilinearformfortheﬁfthruleforthe12AXtask.Thisruleimplementsthesimpleinput-outputmapthatrecognizesthe“X”of“AX”intheappropriate
subcomponent.
As already mentioned, the most signiﬁcant lacuna in this work is the
actual implementation of the bilinear mapping and matching processes.
This part of the model was partly based on some general computational
notionstakenfromworkonmultiplicativelygatedworkingmemory(Frank
et al., 2001; Hazy et al., 2006, 2007; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006)t h a t
has taken great pains with systems physiological verisimilitude; further,
models such as basis function networks Olshausen et al. (1993), Poggio
(1990), and Pouget (1997) shifter circuits embody nearly equivalent
computations. The work of Rigotti and Fusi (2006) and Rigotti et al.
(2007) shows another systematic approach to generating the required
complexity of interactions. Of course, precise bilinearity is unlikely to be
an algorithmically accurate description of underlying processes. Thus,
one pressing direction for future work is to understand how it may be
implemented, working on the basis of the conditional computations in
models such as PBWM or those of Rigotti and Fusi (2006) and Rigotti
et al. (2007), but in the context of a much richer architecture of prefrontal
connectivity and processing, as elucidated, for instance by Brass and von
Cramon (2002, 2004) and Bunge (2004). A related lacuna is associated
with learning; we mainly concentrated here on the existence of solutions,
understanding how they can be credibly acquired is also critical.
Further, we made the tacit assumption that the execution of a rule
ultimately depends on the same underlying bilinear architecture as the
execution of a habit. Although as we discuss below, this is attractive from
the statistical perspective of the relationship between rules and habits,
10
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience | November 2007 | Volume 1 | Article 1Bilinearity, rules, and prefrontal cortex
Figure 9. Ruleexecutionforasnapshotofthe12AXtask.TheﬁgurefollowsthesameformatasFigure 5,showing,fromtoptobottom,apartofthesequence
of inputs and outputs, the identity of the rule that matches, and the number of rules that were recalled from the associative store.
it does pose a challenging issue about how habitual synaptic efﬁcacies
can be acquired in a structure whilst a different conditional input-output
mapping is being instantiated.
Relationship to previous work
Close cousins of our work are the PBWM architecture and those of Rigotti
and Fusi (2006) and Rigotti et al. (2007), from which the habitual part
of our model borrowed extensively. In particular, we purloined the nature
andcontrolofworkingmemoryfromPBWM,thatis,thatinputinformation
separatedintodifferenttypes(taskidentiﬁersandcolors)canbeseparately
stored, that a major computational role is played by gating the storage of
information into or out of activity-based, persistent working memory, and
indeed that the control of external actions (such as pressing a response
button) is of a piece with the control of internal actions (such as storing
an input into working memory). PBWM implements gating in a rather
particular manner, using striato-thalamo-cortical feedback in a stripe; we
have considered a more abstract scheme, with multilinear interactions,
whichcanimplementmoregeneralinput-outputmappings.Inthisrespect,
ourworkisclosertothatofRigottiandFusi(2006)andRigottiet al.(2007),
who consider input-output rules of the form that we have studied, and
investigate the importance of hidden units in solving complex cognitive
tasks.
The most salient difference from these notions involves the rules
themselves.Inexecution,eachindividualrulejustspeciﬁesarathersimple
input-output mapping; the problems arise in compiling the instructions
provided for a task into a complete collection of rules; storing the rules in
an associative memory; retrieving them based on similarity to the current
state; testing their detailed match; and then executing them. Only the
execution is as for a single input-output mapping in PBWM; the remaining
tasks are different. We provided algorithmic solutions to all the problems
apart from compilation, and have argued that they require not much more
of the substrate than is typically assumed in other domains.
Koechlinet al.(2003)andKoechlinandSummerﬁeld(2007)usedtheir
CIOM task to elucidate the localization of different aspects of control.
They suggest that the various orthogonal factors underlying their task
designwereeachseparatelyrepresentedindifferentareasindorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, creating an overall hierarchy. Hierarchical models of
varioussortshavelongbeenofenduringinterest—forinstance,Badreand
D’Esposito (2007) suggested a related representational hierarchy on the
basis of an experiment that parametrically manipulated information about
response, cues, and context. Since it is not based on these hierarchies,
it is incomplete (although we do comment below about the hierarchical
statistical decomposition of the bilinear forms). However, our model, like
others, does pose a question about habitization in these tasks. There
is no reason to think that even such a complex task would not, in
the end, become habitized, like many others. It is not quite clear the
point in the process at which the experimental data were collected,
and thus how the conclusions about localization would change over the
course of acquisition and expression. Any such changes might break
the compelling link between the abstract, informational demands of the
task, and the particular hierarchical realization across prefrontal cortex.
Clearly,thereremainsanenduringrequirementforworkingmemoryinthe
task; however, many structures, even outside prefrontal cortex (see, e.g.,
Major and Tank, 2004), exhibit persistent activity, the putative substrate
ofworkingmemory(e.g.,Fuster,1997;Goldman-Rakic,1995),andsothe
necessity for the persistent involvement of high level prefrontal structures
is not clear.
We have concentrated on the links to suggestions about prefrontal
cortical function and the relationship between habits and rules, but there
are some relevant suggestions about implementing forms of (human) rule
processing Anderson (1976), Johnson-Laird (1983), Newell and Simon
(1972), and Sacerdoti (1977) in neural-, or at least connectionist-like
systems (see Hinton, 1991). For instance, Touretzky and Hinton (1988)
suggested a model called Distributed Connectionist Production System
(DCPS). DCPS involves a working memory consisting of a (possibly large)
numberofactive“triples”over(abstract)entities(tobethoughtofaslogical
statementssuchas“ABC”)togetherwithanumberofrulesthatexecuteif
theymatchthecurrentsetoftriples,withtheeffectofaddingnewtriples,or
taking away some old ones. Both triples and rules are implemented using
random distributed (binary) representations, and rule matching, which
could also perform a primitive form of uniﬁcation, involves an operation
similar to that in our associative memory, namely settling in a Hopﬁeld
network (Hopﬁeld, 1982) or Boltzmann machine (Hinton and Sejnowski,
1986), but in the context of a speciﬁc architectural design. DCPS is a
very different solution to ours, designed more as a connectionist model
of a general-purpose production system than as a model for cognitive
computations. However, its use of distributed representations rather than
localistonesasemployedbyus(followingFranket al.,2001)isimportant,
as is the operation, though not the instantiation, of uniﬁcation.
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Shastri and Ajjanagadde (1993) suggested another interesting
connectionist-inspired model of chains of ﬁrst-order logical reasoning.
This model employs a form of temporal encoding, using something akin
to phases within an underlying, synchronous, oscillation to indicate the
role that a literal plays (so, for instance, it encodes “John gives a book to
Mary”byhavingunitsrepresenting“John”and“giver”ﬁringatonephase;
“Mary” and “recipient” at another phase; and “Book” and “given-object”
ﬁring at a third phase). Rules are instantiated via explicit, phase-sensitive
connections. Thus, unlike DCPS and our model, adding an extra rule
involves quite some manipulation to the structure of the network, rather
than just the contents of a rule memory; it also places heavy demands on
temporally exact wiring and processing. However, the model does have
substantial attractive logical prowess, performing variable uniﬁcation and
binding.
Extensions
Our model can be extended in various ways. First, part of the complexity
of the rule sets was predicated on a requirement that only one rule should
ultimately match at any point in a trial sequence. It would be more natural
to specify a number of rules that all match, but to allow some to be more
important than others. This would also allow a default rule, specifying the
input-output mapping if nothing else matched at all. This could readily
be achieved via the associative matching process, if the order in which it
suggests possible rules is inﬂuenced by this hierarchy; implementing this
may be less straightforward.
Asecondextensionwouldbetouncertainty.AkeyfacetofDawet al.’s
(2005) discussion of goal-directed and habitual actions in conditioning
experiments is that the decision between these two structures should
dependontheirrelativeuncertainties.Asinstandardnormativetreatments
of Bayesian cue integration (Clark and Yuille, 1990), the more certain a
sourceofinformation,thegreatertheweightitshouldhaveindetermining
choice. In this paper, we did not model the uncertainties, and so did not
capture the transfer of behavioral control through habitization. Certainty
in the rule set could come along with imperfect knowledge about the
rules and be captured using |ar
i| < 1 for matches and non-matches.
Uncertainty in the habits could be learned though monitoring errors.
However, as discussed by Daw et al. (2005), this would be much more
difﬁcult in the case of full sequential decision-making problems such
as that posed by the 12AX task. We would deﬁnitely expect habitual
performance ultimately to dominate, given the computational challenges
and expense involved in the use of rules.
A third issue is a subtle constraint on the matching process itself. The
two tasks we modeled can be solved in such a way that the matches
are always prespeciﬁed (for instance, for the CIOM, matching the task
stimulus input to a particular number). However, in more general cases it
isdesirabletomakethematchingconditionsbevariable—forinstance,to
require that the contents of the taskWM working memory match the task
input, whatever it happens to be. For instance, at least given appropriate
training, chimpanzees can learn an abstract delayed response task in
whichtheirresponsesatthetimeofateststimulusarrayshoulddependon
whetherornotthetwoobjectspresentedatthesampletimewereidentical
(Thompson et al., 1997). Computing such a match is a straightforward
bilinear computation; specifying what should match with what could be
more involved. There are potentially also even more complex aspects to
matching, such as the variable speciﬁcation that happens as part of the
uniﬁcation matching operation in prolog and that the systems of Shastri
and Ajjanagadde (1993) and Touretzky and Hinton (1988) can instantiate.
It is not clear how essential a component this would be for the range of
cognitive tasks that have so far been used.
Fourth is the relationship between representational learning and both
rules and habits. A conventional view of representational learning is that
it proceeds in a self-supervised manner, providing representations that
make task learning simpler (Hinton and Ghahramani, 1997). For instance,
in CIOM, if the representation of the input stimulus was augmented
with a bit indicating whether or not it was a subcomponent identiﬁer,
then the eight rules used to indicate the need to store these identiﬁers
could be collapsed to a single rule. The associated habit form would also
becomesubstantiallysimpler.Inthiscase,representationallearningwould
be creating what Hinton (1981) called a microfeature—a semantically
relevant component of the representation of a stimulus. In our simple
case, this microfeature could, for instance, be learned from functional
similarity between these stimuli; self-supervised learning can make
representationally explicit, general facets of the statistics of the inputs.
Aﬁfthextensionwouldbetothemoregeneraluseofepisodicmemory.
Atpresent,rulesareassumedtobestoredinaformoflong-termmemory,
oratleasttopersistacrossthedurationofeachtaskasawhole.However,
theobservationthathumanscanexecuteruleswithbranchingsubroutines
suggests that it is also interesting to consider whether information about
thecurrentstateofworkingmemoryandruleexecutioncouldbestoredina
shortertermepisodicstoreattheinitiationofabranch,andthenrecalledat
theend.Oneprevalent(thoughnotuncontestedBurgesset al.,2007)idea
is that fronto-polar cortex has a particular role to play in branching (e.g.,
Braver and Bongiolatti, 2002; Koechlin et al., 1999), and also in the links
with episodic memory (reviewed in Christoff and Gabrieli, 2000); which
may be a relevant conﬂuence. Once coupled with this capacity, it would
become particularly pressing to understand the formal computational
capacity of the model, along with what would be necessary to make
it more computationally universal.
Rules and habit statistics
The most essential structural extension to the present work has to do
with more fundamental questions about the relationship between rules
and habits. One attractive direction is to consider the structure of the
overall statistical space of habits, and then to consider how rules ﬁt into
this structure. This approach has been considered in the domain of motor
control (e.g., Sanger, 1995; Todorov, 2004), and has obvious application
to cognitive control too.
We referred above to work on representational learning as potentially
providing a source of semantically relevant microfeatures that would aid
bothrulesandhabits(HintonandGhahramani,1997).Theideaunderlying
this is that the sensory inputs occupy a low dimensional structure in
the extremely high dimensional space of all inputs, and that learning
identiﬁesanew,typicallynon-linear,coordinatesystemthatcharacterizes
this structure. For instance, one popular such characterization is in terms
of the independent components of the overall space (Bell and Sejnowski,
1995). The microfeatural representation of an input is then the location in
this new coordinate system of an input; it will be useful if each coordinate
captures something fundamental about the inputs as a whole. In one
class of models, top-down connections in cortex instantiate a generative
or synthetic model, indicating where a location in the new coordinate
system maps to in input space; bottom-up connections an analytical or
recognition model (Dayan et al., 1995; Hinton and Zemel, 1994; Hinton
et al.,1995;Mumford,1994;Neisser,1967;RaoandBallard,1999),which
implementsthepossiblycomplexmapfromanewinputintoitsunderlying
coordinates.
In our case, self-supervised learning would determine a coordinate
systemappropriatetothestatisticalspaceofhabits(i.e.,thebilinearforms
associated with them). Then the rules that can be represented would be
simply speciﬁed in terms of this coordinate system, with the top-down,
generative, model provides the mechanism for instantiating a rule. This is
exactly the scheme that Kali and Dayan (2004) employed in allowing the
contents of medial temporal episodic memory to recreate a whole pattern
in input posterior cortical units.
It is as (habitual) behavioral capacities grow that this statistical space,
and therefore the space of rules, gets richer and more complex. In our
case, the recognition process of determining the coordinates underlying
a particular habit is not so critical. More important is the compilation
process, taking a typically verbal description of a problem and turning
12
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience | November 2007 | Volume 1 | Article 1Bilinearity, rules, and prefrontal cortex
it into the underlying rules and matching conditions, analogous to, just
for instance, the way that Johnson-Laird et al. (1992) and Johnson-Laird
(1983)considerparsingverbaldescriptionsandgeneratingtheirpreferred
psychological construct (mental models). In studying complex tasks with
very many rules, Duncan (personal communication) has pointed out that
subjects may frequently not perform this compilation step adequately
thoroughly, and thereby miss out important contingencies in the task.
Indeed once the mechanisms for rule implementation are determined, it
iscompilation,andtherulesandhabitsthatunderliecompilation,thatwill
be the remaining homuncular mystery.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix we provide details of the model and the training regimes.
The network has 14 input units, one each for 8 possible task
subcomponent identiﬁers (this is for the CIOM task; only 2 are used for
12AX) and the 6 input colors. These employ localist coding. There are
also 14 working memory units. Output unit oc is deﬁned by a collection
of weights (28 × 28 for the bilinear form Wc; 28 for the linear term uc
a n d1f o rt h eb i a sbc). In this case, this representation is redundant, since
only the symmetric part of Wc affects the task; and, for binary inputs, Wc
ii
plays the same role as uc
i. However, we used the more general form for
completeness, and it does not prevent the gradient descent learning rule
from working.
Learning of the weights for habits is supervised, as if successful
execution of the rules of the task provided a correct assignment of all the
output units o for each input in the sequence. As mentioned in the text,
this includes the effect of teacher forcing, in the sense that the contents
of working memory will always be set to be correct throughout learning,
even at a point at which the habitual outputs are not yet appropriate.
FortheCIOM,acompletetrainingsetcanbespeciﬁed,withoneinput-
output case for storing the identiﬁers for each of the subcomponents; and
then three input-output cases for each of the color-output mappings in
each subcomponent (including the repeats for the subcomponents with
only two possible inputs). The complete training set for CIOM is therefore
32 cases with 28 inputs deﬁning the state (including the input and the
working memory) and 6 outputs. Outputs that are immaterial (the blank
entries in Table 2) do not generate errors and therefore do not inﬂuence
the course of learning.
Learning used the conjugate gradient, line-search-based
minimize routine kindly provided by Carl Rasmussen
(http://www.kyb.tuebingen.mpg.de/bs/people/carl/code/minimize/).
For Figure 2 for the CIOM task, nominal reaction times were calculated
assuming a drift-diffusion decision-making process for which the
probability pc = P(oc) for action c is turned into a reaction time rtc
according to
y
c =
1
2
log
pc
1 − pc rt
c =
1
yc
1 − e−2yc
1 + e−2yc (3)
as if the drift rate of a DDM with unit noise is set to ensure the
appropriateprobabilitypc andthereactiontimecalculated.Whenhabitual
performance is tested, teacher forcing is not active, so store and clear-t
(and, were it to have been used, clear-c) are under the direct control of
the habitual output.
For the 12AX task, the sequential structure and randomness makes
it hard to generate a compact, comprehensive training set. Instead, a
pseudo-randomsampleof384inputpatternswasused,withaprobability
of switching between “1” and “2” sub-tasks of 1/20 per pattern, and a
probability of inserting a “AX” or a “BY” in each sub-task of 1/5. Unlike
some variants of the task, all the other letters were chosen at random,
equiprobably. The rest of the training proceeded as for the CIOM task.
When being tested, a new pseudo-random sequence of inputs, based on
a new seed, was generated.
Each rule is implemented by a bilinear map that is just like the bilinear
map of one of the habits that was just presented. However, the input-
output mapping for each rule is substantially simpler than for the whole
habit, since it only needs to represent a highly restricted set of cases (as
apparent in Tables 2 and 4). These input-output mappings are taught to
the network in the same manner as above, but using training sets that
are restricted precisely to the domain of each rule. Thus, for instance, for
the CIOM task, each rule for a subcomponent only involves three cases,
one for each colored square that might be presented (including repeats
forsomesubcomponents).Likewise,forthe12AXtask,itisnotnecessary
to generate random sequences of input patterns, since the sequential
structure of the task arises from the matching and execution of the rules
ratherthantherulesthemselves.Forexample,eachofthelowerfourrules
in Table 4 only involves six training cases, one for each color.
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